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1. Introduction  
 
Every few years, there are calls to launch a ―new Marshall Plan,‖ whether for 
Africa, Central America, the ex-Soviet bloc countries, or to fight scourges such as 
HIV/AIDS.  Most recently, Condoleeza Rice framed US plans for spreading democracy 
in the Middle East in terms of a ―new Marshall Plan.‖   
Why is the Marshall Plan analogy so popular?  Because advocates for grand new 
aid initiatives must go back all the way to the 1940s for an example that was widely 
acknowledged as a success.  Performance of aid programs for less-developed nations in 
recent decades is generally considered to be abysmal, even by many aid industry 
advocates and practitioners.  What accounts for the difference in performance?   
Today’s aid recipient nations are certainly different from Marshall Plan 
beneficiaries in important ways.  Despite wartime death and destruction, Western Europe 
had skilled labor, experienced managers and entrepreneurs, and a history of reasonably 
effective financial and judicial systems, and public administrations (Degnbol-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 288).   
Donors are also different today, however.  There are many, many more of them.    
Marshall Plan recipients had to deal only with a single donor, in contrast to the dozens of 
bilateral and multilateral agencies and hundreds of NGOs in the aid business today.  ―The 
Marshall Plan worked because there was one donor, the U.S., and the U.S. set up rules 
that ensured the Europeans would themselves take charge.‖ 1  Marshall Plan aid was 
similar to a structural adjustment program (De Long and Eichengreen, 1993), but with  
conditions both fewer in number and more aligned with preferences of recipient 
governments than characterize many latter-day programs.  Moreover, unlike much of 
                                                 
1
 From Nancy Birdsall’s ―Foreword‖ in Kanbur and Sandler (1999).          
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today’s aid, Marshall Plan loans were not disbursed in the form of hundreds of separate 
donor-managed projects in each recipient nation.   
The success of aid programs in Taiwan, Botswana and Korea are also commonly 
attributed in part to the presence of a single or dominant donor (Brautigam, 2000; Azam, 
Devarajan and O’Connell, 2002).  In contrast, most recent recipients of large amounts of 
foreign aid interact with dozens of donors, each with projects in a large and increasing 
number of economic sectors (World Bank, 2001).  The UNDP Resident Representative in 
Lesotho in 1981 counted 61 donors financing 321 projects, in a country of only 1.4 
million people (Morss, 1984).  In 2002, there were 25 bilateral and 19 multilateral donors 
and about 350 international NGOS operating in Vietnam, accounting for over 8000 
development projects (Acharya et al., 2003).  In the typical African country, aid is 
provided by ―some thirty official donors in addition to several dozen international 
NGOs…through over a thousand distinct projects and several hundred resident foreign 
experts‖ (van de Walle, 2001: 58).  Thousands of quarterly project reports are submitted 
to multiple oversight agencies.  Hundreds of missions monitor and evaluate these projects 
and programs annually in many recipients, and each mission expects to meet with key 
government officials and to obtain comments from officials on its reports (van de Walle 
and Johnston, 1996).
2
         
Why should aid may be more effective when delivered by a single (or dominant) 
donor?  Where many donors -- each responsible for only a small part of development 
assistance – operate, responsibility is diffused.  Any single donor has little reputational 
stake in success or failure of the recipient’s development program (Belton, 2003).  From 
the perspective of a recipient country’s welfare, incentives for any one donor to shirk on 
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 Tanzania in desperation recently imposed a temporary moratorium on donor missions.   
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activities that maximize overall development in favor of activities that contribute to 
donor-specific goals strengthen as the number of donors increases. 
Donors’ multiple and conflicting objectives exacerbate this basic collective action 
problem.  Donors are undoubtedly in most or all cases concerned with development of 
the recipient country, but must trade this objective off against other goals as well, such as 
commercial and security objectives.  Aid agencies additionally have the objective of 
maximizing their budgets, requiring them to satisfy key domestic constituencies in 
parliament – requiring in turn that they sacrifice development objectives when those 
inevitably sometimes conflict with the need to maintain good relations with domestic aid 
contractors and advocacy groups.  To build domestic support for large aid budgets --  
particularly in donor nations such as the U.S. where voters tend to be more skeptical of 
the value of foreign aid – the impact of aid programs must be visible, quantifiable, and 
directly attributable to the donor’s activities.  These requirements often can be met only 
at the expense of reducing the actual developmental benefits from aid programs.   
Costs associated with a proliferation of donors can be grouped into two broad 
categories.  Some costs are felt immediately, with the burden falling primarily on the 
projects or sectors in question.  Tying aid to the employment of donor-country 
contractors is a major example.
3
  Also detracting from aid’s value are transactions costs 
associated with numerous and diverse donor rules and procedures for managing aid 
projects and programs, different languages and fiscal calendars, etc. (see Berg, 1993: 81; 
UNDP, 2003: 148).4      
                                                 
3 This practice is estimated to reduce aid’s real value by between 15% and 30% (Jepma, 1991). 
4 In Vietnam, it took 18 months and the involvement of 150 government workers to purchase five vehicles 
for a project funded by several donors with diverse procurement policies (World Bank, 2003).  In Bolivia, 
five donors sponsoring a single poverty survey each required separate financial and technical reporting, 
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The second category of costs is more insidious and long-lasting, involving donor 
practices that tend to undermine the quality of governance or retard the development of 
public sector capacity.  A few examples of these practices include providing aid through 
projects rather than through budget support, bypassing central government units (for 
example, by the use of project implementation units), relying on expatriates instead of 
subsidizing ―learning by doing‖ by hiring local staff, and funding investment projects that 
in the aggregate imply unrealistically high recurrent expenditures in future years – so that 
roads are often built but not repaired, and schools are built but not staffed (Brautigam, 
2000).  Donors engage in these practices to increase the visibility of their efforts and the 
short-term appearance of success for their individual projects, at the expense of coherent 
policy making and capacity building in the recipient country’s public sector (World 
Bank, 1998: 84).  It is well-known in the aid business that however successful a project 
appears on its own terms, it will have little or no sustained impact in a poor sector-policy 
environment, and where it is not integrated into other donor-funded or government 
projects (Easterly, 2003: 7; Kanbur and Sandler, 1999: 29).  However, where there are 
numerous donors, any one of them would gain only a small share of the total benefits, in 
terms of project success, from devoting resources to improving administrative capacity in 
the country, and would be subsidizing the success mostly of other donors’ projects. 
  Shifting this discussion from conceptual arguments and anecdotes toward 
systematic measurement and testing, the next section introduces measures of the degree 
of donor fragmentation in aid recipient countries.  Using these measures, section 3 
                                                                                                                                                 
leading the government official assigned to the project to spend nearly as much of her time meeting these 
requirements as in undertaking the actual survey (World Bank, 2003).  ―Country analytic work‖ (e.g. 
poverty assessments, public expenditure reviews, governance and investment climate assessments) 
sponsored by donors is often duplicated, with authors of these reports often unaware of each other’s work 
(OECD, 2003: ch. 2; Easterly, 2003: 15). 
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describes several pieces of cross-country evidence, suggesting that fragmentation may 
reduce quality of the public administration in aid recipients, distort public expenditure 
allocations, and impair progress on public budgetary management reform efforts.                  
2. Measuring Donor Fragmentation and Project Proliferation 
Two different data sources can be used for constructing useful measures of donor 
fragmentation and project proliferation.  A breakdown of annual disbursements of official 
development assistance (ODA) by various bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, 
treating the various UN agencies as separate donors, is provided in OECD (2004).  From 
these data, an index of donor fragmentation can be calculated for each aid recipient 
country, for each year, by summing the squared shares of aid over all donor agencies and 
subtracting the resulting Herfindahl index from 1, to form an index for which higher 
values reflect greater fragmentation of aid.
5
  Values for this index increase with the 
number of donors providing aid to the country, and with greater equality of aid shares 
among donors, reflecting the absence of a dominant donor.   
During the year 2000 among recipients of substantial amounts of aid, 
fragmentation averages about .7.  Values were lowest for Jordan (.21) and Zimbabwe 
(.25).  Many African countries had values above .9, including Mozambique (.91), 
Ethiopia (.92), Lesotho and Cape Verde (.93).   
Year-by-year changes in this fragmentation index, averaged over all countries, 
show an upward trend from 1975 onward (figure 1).  This increase largely reflects an 
increase in the number of DAC donors.  For example, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was founded in 1991, to aid the transition 
                                                 
5 O’Connell and Saludo (2001) compute Herfindahl indexes of donor concentration for aid recipients in 
Africa in the 1990s using the DAC data. 
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economies in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.  Over time, some aid recipients 
such as Greece and Portugal became donors.
6
   
In addition to the DAC disbursements data, the Development Gateway’s AiDA 
(Accessible Information on Development Activities) data base is used to construct an 
alternative fragmentation index.  This source contains records provided by the DAC and 
other sources on hundreds of thousands of investment projects and other activities 
financed by various donor agencies.
7
  A count of projects sponsored by each donor can be 
made.  From these counts, a fragmentation index is computed from donors’ shares of 
projects.  Fragmentation indexes were computed two different ways, first treating each  
agency or department as separate donors (for example, USAID and USDA), and second, 
treating each funding nation (e.g. the USA) or multilateral institution as a single donor.  
The mean for the first index is (by construction) somewhat higher, but the two indexes 
turn out to be nearly perfectly correlated.  For this project-based fragmentation index for 
the post-1990 period, values range from .07 for Suriname to .90 for Niger and Mongolia, 
and .92 for Turkey.   
 The fragmentation indexes calculated from project counts in AiDA provide a 
somewhat different picture of donor fragmentation across countries than does the index 
calculated from DAC aid volumes.  The latter, averaged for the 1990s, is correlated at 
only .44 with indexes based on projects with start dates in the 1990s.  The two types of 
indexes are not directly comparable, however.  First, the DAC data used include only 
ODA, while the AiDA data base also includes some non-concessional loans.  Second, it 
is more difficult to pin down relevant dates for the projects data.  About 60% of all  
                                                 
6 The trend in this measure may overstate the increase in donor uncoordination, however, as budget support 
and the prevalence of sector-wide approaches has increased somewhat in recent years. 
7
 See http://aida.developmentgateway.org/AidaHome.do 
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activities included in AiDA lack project start and end dates.  Indexes computed for any 
given sub-period, such as the post-1990 period, require dropping all projects without start 
dates.  Particularly for years prior to 1987, such indexes will therefore be based on very 
incomplete project data.
8
  Unlike the case using the DAC disbursements data, AiDA 
cannot be used to generate annual fragmentation values at all.  However, it is likely that 
fragmentation is fairly stable across countries over time; e.g. the fragmentation indexes 
for 1982 and 1997 based on DAC aid volumes are correlated at .87.  An index based on 
all AiDA records (some dating to the late 1940s) is correlated with one based on 
activities with start dates of 1990 or later at .81.  
   Certain caveats apply equally to interpretation of both sets of fragmentation 
measures.  Most notably, a donor’s expenditure share or project count share will not 
always accurately reflect its level of involvement and influence in a recipient’s 
development program.  Both the DAC- nor AiDA-based indexes measure only donors’  
―market shares.‖  One donor may undertake its activities in ways that are less intrusive 
and less institutionally corrosive than another donor with a similar share of aid.   
 Fragmentation can be computed for different aid sectors, such as education, 
health, and water, because projects (in AiDA) and aid commitments (but not 
disbursements, in the DAC data) are coded by sector.  A high level of fragmentation 
overall is in principal consistent with donor specialization and hence low fragmentation 
in individual sectors.  Mean levels of  fragmentation in fact are somewhat -- but not 
dramatically -- lower within individual sectors.  However, in countries where 
fragmentation overall is high, fragmentation within sectors also tends to be high. 
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The number of projects with start dates for 1987 is five times the number for 1986, and the number 
doubled from 1994 to 1995, suggesting that some donors failed to report start dates until recently.   
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 The AiDA data base can also be used to construct a project proliferation measure, 
from the total count of projects recorded in a period (with or without adjusting for size of 
the recipient country), subject to the limitations noted above.  Table 1 lists the ten 
countries with the largest number of projects with start dates after 1990.
9
  Larger 
countries, unsurprisingly, tend to have more projects.  The correlation between (log of) 
1990 population and (the log of) projects is .62.  Also not surprising, fragmented aid 
tends to be associated with project proliferation: the DAC-based and AiDA-based 
fragmentation indexes for the 1990s are each correlated at about .51 with (the log of) the 
number of projects with start dates of 1990 or later.  This relationship remains very strong 
controlling for population.    
3. Where is Aid More Fragmented?   
 Table 2 reports mean levels of fragmentation and project counts (for 1990 and 
later) for various country groups.  Donor fragmentation and project proliferation tends to 
be more extreme in low-income than in middle-income aid recipients.  By region, Latin 
America and East Asia/Pacific stand out for having lower rates of fragmentation.  Both 
project counts and fragmentation measures are highest in South Asia; an obvious 
hypothesis is that this has something to do with the average size of countries and low 
average incomes in this region, which includes India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.     
 Table 3 reports regressions of country-level fragmentation and project counts on 
aid/GNI, per capita income, country size, and as et of regional dummies (with sub-
Saharan Africa as the reference category).  The partial effect of aid levels on the AiDA-
based fragmentation variables is insignificant (equations 1 and 2).  Aid is actually 
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 These counts of projects with post-1990 start dates were obtained from Virginia Yee of the Development 
Gateway in 2002.  Updated counts presumably would be substantially higher.   
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negatively related to fragmentation averaged over 1990-2001 as measured by DAC 
disbursements (equation 3).  As expected, aid is positively and significantly associated 
with project counts (equation 4). 
 Per capita income is significantly related only to the disbursements-based 
fragmentation measure, with higher incomes associated with lower fragmentation 
(equation 3).  Some but not all fragmentation measures are positively and significantly 
associated with country size (equations 1-3).  Other things (including aid/GNI) equal, 
larger countries have more projects (equation 4).  
 Even with the control variables, the same two regions -- Latin America/Caribbean 
and East Asia/Pacific – stand out for their lower rates of fragmentation.  Latin America 
however has significantly more projects than otherwise predicted by country size, and aid 
and income levels (equation 4).  East Europe/Central Asia stands out for its high 
fragmentation values (equations 1 and 2).  The South Asia dummy is insignificant in 
every case: the high average rates of fragmentation and project proliferation for these 
countries in Table 2 are explained very well in Table 3 by their  large populations, and to 
a lesser extent by their relatively low incomes and aid/GNI levels.       
4. Does Fragmentation Matter? Cross-Country Evidence   
 
Poaching 
Pressures to show tangible results for their projects commonly leads donors to pay 
salary supplements to the more talented local staff.  This practice distorts incentives for 
civil servants to turn their attention away from their other responsibilities—even those 
with greater impact on development--and towards the donor’s projects (Arndt, 2000: 166-
 10 
7).
10
  It also creates incentives for officials to protect and extend aid projects from which 
they benefit, regardless of their merit, and to help  perpetuate the practice of spending aid 
funds in the form of independent projects rather than in the form of coordinated, sector-
wide programs or budget support (Acharya et al., 2003).  Examples of these problems are 
prevalent in Africa.   
In Niger, for instance, the majority of NGOs appear to be operated by moonlighting 
civil servants and ex-ministers of cabinet.  In several cases, high-level officials left 
government to create NGOs in order to receive donor support that had once gone to 
the official’s ministry (van de Walle, 2001: 165).  
 
In Malawi and other southern African countries, doctors and nurses are leaving public 
hospitals and clinics in droves, ―to take more lucrative positions in foreign-funded HIV-
AIDS programs‖ (Burkhalter, 2004).  Fallon and da Silva (1994: 98) write of 
Mozambique:    
Donor-driven competition for skilled personnel is creating immense 
problems for government.  The preoccupation of many donors with 
ensuring that their local administrations have a full complement of 
qualified staff and with securing, at all costs, the manpower required to 
implement their projects is depriving the government of the capacity to 
effectively manage its administration.    
 
In this spirit, Knack and Rahman (2003) write down a simple formal model of 
donors’ choices regarding whether or not to ―poach‖ the better-qualified civil servants to 
run their own projects.  A competent government bureaucracy increases the returns to all 
donor-run projects, but in maximizing the likelihood of success in their respective 
projects, each donor treats the government bureaucracy as a common-pool resource.  
Where there are fewer donors, each with a larger share of projects adversely affected by 
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 In Malawi some years ago, 33 of the 36 permanent secretaries attended a week-long meeting to discuss 
the EU’s aid program.  This level of participation was achieved by paying them the same daily rate as 
Brussels staff on mission.  ―The EU had bought the government for a week – doubtless on the agenda was 
the government’s inability to implement its policies‖ (private correspondence with World Bank specialist 
on African civil services).    
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deteriorating administrative capacity, the external costs from poaching may be 
sufficiently high for an individual donor to influence its decision. 
The model predicts that bureaucratic quality will erode more in recipients with 
greater donor fragmentation, i.e. with a larger number of donors each with a smaller share 
of the project market.  Bureaucratic quality can be measured by a subjective index 
available for most countries from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), over the 
1982-2001 period.  Controlling for aid/GNI, the initial level of bureaucratic quality, the 
length of the interval over which ICRG data are available for each country, population 
growth, and per capita income growth, Knack and Rahman (2004) find that donor 
fragmentation is associated with larger declines (or smaller improvements) in 
bureaucratic quality.  Figure 2 depicts the partial relationship between fragmentation 
(measured by the AiDA project counts) and changes in bureaucratic quality for sub-
Saharan Africa, the most aid-intensive region.    
Public Expenditures  
Greater donor fragmentation, implying reduced donor accountability, can increase 
the risk of uncontrolled investment spending.  A donor with a small share of the aid 
market in a country is less likely to be concerned about whether future recurrent spending 
implied by today’s investment projects are sustainable, and about whether the projects are 
mutually consistent.  It is more likely to bypass the central finance and planning 
ministries to work directly with line ministries or local governments which view future 
budgets as a common resource pool (Brautigam, 2000).   
Unless aid is fully fungible, more aid can be expected to raise capital expenditure 
as a share of total public spending.  The arguments here imply that this tendency should 
 12 
be stronger where donor fragmentation is greater.  Equations 1 and 2 of Table 4 test this 
proposition using cross-country annual data for the period 1975-2001.  Control variables 
include per capita income, population, and a time trend.
11
  In both random (equation 1) 
and fixed (equation 2) effects estimation, the interaction term aid x fragmentation has a 
positive and significant coefficient as expected.  The mean value for capital expenditure 
in the sample is about 22% of central government spending.  The insignificant coefficient 
on the fragmentation term indicates that when aid/GNI is near 0, the level of 
fragmentation unsurprisingly has no significant effect on capital spending.  This effect 
increases significantly as aid increases, however.  For aid/GNI of about 10% (a threshold 
exceeded in about 1/6 of the observations), an increase in fragmentation from .4 to .9 is 
associated with an increase of about 2 percentage points to the capital spending share.    
Fragmentation can also free donors to target their aid to more ―fashionable‖ 
sectors that appeal to home-country constituencies.  In recent years, education and health 
have emerged as the clear fashionable sectors among most donors, in part because of 
their more apparently direct impacts on poverty reduction, which has displaced growth 
and other objectives as the primary motive of aid for most major donors.
12
        
Equations 3 and 4 test the hypothesis that the share of aid targeted to the 
fashionable sectors, education and health, is higher where fragmentation is higher.  The 
hypothesis is supported in the random effects test in equation 3.  Each .1 increment in 
fragmentation is associated with an increase of nearly 0.5 percentage points in the share 
of aid targeted at health and education.  This is a fairly large effect, relative to the sample 
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 Results on fragmentation are unchanged when year dummies are substituted for the linear time trend 
variable.   
12
 The positive and significant coefficients on the time trend variable in equations 3 and 4 reflects the 
increased popularity of social sector aid over time among donors.   
 13 
mean of 11.5% of aid going to those sectors.  Fragmentation is not significant in the more 
demanding fixed effects test of equation 4, however, in which estimates are influenced 
only by within-country variation over time. 
Public Budgetary Management Reform        
 Even where recipient countries are committed to public sector reform programs 
advocated by donors, fragmentation can impair progress if donors’ ideas of ―best 
practice‖ vary at all, or if donors are each responsible for only a small part of the overall 
reform program.  As part of the HIPC debt relief initiative, 24 HIPC countries agreed to 
participate in an IMF-World Bank assessment of their public budgetary systems.  With 
assistance from these institutions, countries agreed to ―action plans‖ to address various 
weaknesses that were diagnosed in these systems, with the goal of improving donors’ 
confidence that debt relief would be used by recipient governments for worthy poverty-
fighting purposes.  In some countries, a very small number of donor agencies were 
involved in these budgetary reform efforts, while in other countries numerous donors 
provided technical support and advice.  A systematic review found that, controlling for 
other factors, more progress was made on budgetary reform in countries with fewer 
donors ―helping‖ them (IMF/World Bank, 2004).     
5. Conclusions  
 
If fragmentation has damaging consequences, why aren’t more recipients more 
selective about the aid they accept?  In principal, aid recipient governments can take 
measures to prevent the inefficiencies associated with competitive donor practices, either 
by refusing some aid
13
 or by attempting to reduce the number of donors active in the 
                                                 
13 Uganda’s stated policy is to decline all offers of stand-alone donor projects (OECD, 2003: 121).  Eritrea 
also has a reputation for being highly selective about accepting aid offers.  
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country (or, at least, the number active in each sector).  In practice, principal-agent 
problems within the recipient country, either between a government with short time 
horizons and its citizens, or between line ministries and central ministries (Wuyts, 1996: 
742; van de Walle, 2001: 208), often reduce the government’s ability or willingness to 
curtail donor activities that are destructive for the long-run development of the country 
overall.  For political leaders without sufficiently lengthy time horizons, the short-term 
personal benefits of corruption and patronage practices often outweigh the long-term 
costs of subverting administrative capacity (and judicial systems); insecure leaders treat 
the rational-legal order essential for development as a common-pool resource (van de 
Walle, 2001).  
At least in some cases, therefore, poor people in recipient countries could be made 
better off if donors organized to undertake measures aimed at reducing fragmentation.  
This does not mean that a donor cartel should decide on a sole or lead donor to be 
matched with each recipient.  Each recipient could be encouraged to select for itself a 
lead donor, at least for each sector receiving significant volumes of aid.  Presumably  
recipients would normally choose as its lead donor the one with the most relevant 
expertise (based on region or sector) or which comes with the least commercial/security 
objective baggage.   
Strong political forces and other interests work against further increases in donor 
specialization by country or by sector, however.  Leaving certain problems or countries 
for other donors to deal with exposes an aid agency to charges by NGOs or the media that 
it is irresponsibly under-funding critically important development problems.
14
  Arcane 
                                                 
14
 For example, a Washington Post editorial (―Action for AIDS,‖ December 6 2003) complained that 
―Australia has not given a cent‖ to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.    
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justifications based on efficiency benefits of donor harmonization and comparative 
advantage are unlikely to be an effective public-relations response.  Inter-agency funding 
could be a partial solution to this problem.  Norway and Sweden both fund education and 
health sector programs in Ethiopia, but Sweden is arranging to channel its health funding 
through Norway, while Norway will channel its education funding through Sweden 
(OECD, 2003: 97).   
Competition at the global level among aid agencies also tends to inhibit 
specialization; for example the World Bank attempts to establish intellectual leadership in 
as many development themes and sectors as possible.  Despite the ongoing high-level 
harmonization initiatives by aid agencies, there remain grounds for skepticism that 
political and bureaucratic exigencies of donors will be trumped by demands for improved 
aid effectiveness (van de Walle, 2001: 233; OECD, 2003: 118).    
 Publicizing various measures of donor performance, by the OECD DAC or by 
independent organizations such as the Center for Global Development, could marginally 
improve the incentives faced by aid agencies.  Performance measures could include not 
only the share of aid that is tied, but also measures of how each donor proliferates aid 
across recipients and sectors (Acharya et al., 2003), the share of aid channeled through 
multilateral organizations, the number of missions and reports required relative to aid 
levels, and frequency of delegation to lead donors.   
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Table 1 
Project Counts (start date of 1990 or subsequent) 
Source: AidA, 2003 (Development Gateway) 
 
India 3013 
South Africa 2393 
Tanzania 2382 
Mozambique 2147 
Bangladesh 1972 
Russia 1911 
Indonesia 1909 
Zimbabwe 1867 
Kenya 1833 
Ethiopia 1762 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Fragmentation and Proliferation  
by income and region groupings 
 
 AiDA 
(agency) 
AiDA 
(donor) 
DAC Projects 
(AiDA) 
Low-income .79 .78 .80 606 
Middle-income .68 .67 .68 325 
     
Sub-Saharan Africa (45) .79 .78 .80 606 
East Europe/Central Asia (10) .86 .85 .66 537 
South Asia (6) .81 .80 .85 809 
Middle East/North Africa (8) .80 .79 .75 242 
Latin America/Caribbean (18) .58 .57 .64 361 
East Asia/Pacific (22) .57 .56 .57 269 
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Table 3 
Correlates of Donor Fragmentation 
 
 
Equation 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Dependent variable 
 
AIDA 
(agency)  
 
AIDA 
(donor) 
 
DAC 
 
Project 
count 
 
Constant 
 
14.60 
(44.27) 
 
12.87 
(43.97) 
 
201.71 
(40.31) 
 
-3.50 
(1.52) 
 
Aid/GNI 
 
0.11 
(0.12) 
 
 0.12 
(0.12) 
 
-0.20* 
(0.10) 
 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
Log GDP per capita, 
1990 
 
-0.85 
 (3.53) 
 
-0.68 
(3.52) 
 
-13.21* 
(3.52) 
 
0.04 
(0.12) 
 
Log population, 
1990 
 
 4.48** 
 (1.56) 
 
4.46** 
(1.54) 
 
-2.36 
(1.31) 
 
0.58** 
(0.06) 
 
Latin 
America/Caribbean 
 
-13.01* 
(6.36) 
 
 -12.84* 
(6.32) 
 
 1.26 
(5.61) 
 
 0.59** 
(0.21) 
 
East Europe/Central 
Asia 
 
 8.79** 
(3.28) 
 
8.08* 
(3.29) 
 
-7.04 
(4.75) 
 
-0.26 
(0.27) 
 
Middle East/North 
Africa 
 
-0.66 
 (7.84) 
 
-1.09 
(7.45) 
 
 4.46 
(5.59) 
 
-0.66 
(0.34) 
 
South Asia 
 
 0.83 
(5.83) 
 
1.04 
(5.83) 
 
 1.61 
(2.60) 
 
 0.22 
 (0.18) 
 
East Asia/Pacific 
 
-12.70* 
(4.99) 
 
-12.32* 
(4.94) 
 
-12.27* 
(5.15) 
 
 0.19 
(0.20) 
 
R
2 
 
 
.50 
 
.49 
 
.52 
 
.69 
 
Std. error of est. 
 
13.9 
 
13.7 
 
12.8 
 
0.65 
 
Mean, dep. var.  
 
73.6 
 
72.9 
 
75.6 
 
5.63 
Sample includes countries with aid’s share of GDP exceeding 2%.  Sample size is 89 in 
equations 1-2 and 4, and 90 in equation 3.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  A * 
(**) indicates significance at .05 (.01) for two-tailed tests.  Dependent variable is 
fragmentation index in equations 1-3 (multiplied by 100) and log of projects count in 
equation 4.  Dependent variables are based on AiDA projects with start dates of 1990 or 
later in equations 1-2 and 4, and for equation 3 is the average over 1990-2001 of annual 
values constructed from DAC disbursements data.    
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 Table 4 
Donor Fragmentation and Distortion of Public Expenditures  
 
 
Equation 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Capital expenditure as share of 
total  
 
Social sector share of aid 
 
Method 
 
Random effects 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Random effects 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Year 
 
-0.396** 
(0.035) 
 
 -0.666** 
(0.056) 
 
0.461** 
(0.037) 
 
0.576** 
(0.082) 
 
Log GDP per 
capita 
 
3.796** 
 (0.898) 
 
10.809** 
(1.163) 
 
-0.449 
(0.512) 
 
1.196 
(1.502) 
 
Log population 
 
 0.081 
 (0.586) 
 
8.684** 
(2.014) 
 
-0.854** 
(0.221) 
 
-6.078* 
(3.009) 
 
Aid/GNI (%) 
 
-0.045 
(0.153) 
 
 -0.040 
(0.153) 
 
 -0.136** 
(0.039) 
 
 -0.165** 
(0.047) 
 
Fragmentation 
(DAC) 
 
 0.368 
(1.734) 
 
0.211 
(1.717) 
 
4.583** 
(1.745) 
 
0.620 
(2.328) 
 
Aid*fragmentation 
 
0.393* 
 (0.185) 
 
0.368* 
(0.186) 
 
 
 
 
 
N  
 
1338 
 
2867 
 
R
2 
(within group) 
 
.13 
 
.16 
 
.05 
 
.05 
 
Mean, dep. var.  
 
21.8 
 
11.5 
 
Dependent variable in equations 1 and 2 is capital expenditure as a percentage of all 
central government expenditure (capital and current).  Dependent variable in equations 3 
and 4 is health and education sector aid as a percentage of all official development 
assistance.  A * (**) indicates significance at .05 (.01) for two-tailed tests.   
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Trend in mean donor fragmentation
Year
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Donor fragmentation & bureaucratic quality
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